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I: Introduction
Eduard Bernstein’s proposals for revising marxist theory
burst like a thunderclap on the late 19th century workers’
movement, and in particular on the German social
democracy. Here was the militant who had suffered 20
years of exile, whose editorship of the party newspaper had
made it such a powerful weapon, the acquaintance of Marx
and the friend and literary executor of Engels, saying in
terms that their scientific method was so fatally flawed that
it should be fundamentally recast.
Not only that, but Marx’s forecasts about the
development of capitalism, made on the basis of this
method, were not only untenable but had already been
exposed by events. These forecasts, Bernstein was
claiming, were not only wrong in detail, but their apparent
conclusion—the inevitable breakdown of capitalism—was
now clearly unsustainable.
Bernstein’s position, first set out in a series of articles,
and rejected at the party’s Stuttgart conference in 1898,
was given a unified expression in a book published the
following year. This centenary, in an era when “capitalism
has won”, supposedly, is an appropriate moment to review
Bernstein’s claims. However, the object of this essay is not
to refute Bernstein’s empirical conclusions, which have
been dealt with adequately by history, nor is it a revisiting
of contemporary political debates about revisionism.
Rather, it is to examine the intellectual sources of his
error, and in particular to examine Bernstein’s views on
the determinism which he maintained was a central feature
of the historical materialist method. This is important,
because—as I claimed in passing in a previous IWGVT
paper (Wells 1997) but did not substantiate—there is a
pervasive atmosphere of determinism in the thought of
many marxists, which is, however, unjustified by anything
to be found in the works of Marx and Engels.
The paper will first review Bernstein’s critique of Marx
and Engels, and suggest that his misunderstanding is not
simply attributable to any personal scholarly
shortcomings, but was a feature of marxist thought in
general at that time; it will then show that Bernstein,
despite his long and close association with Engels, simply
failed to grasp even the obvious tendency of the latter’s
works; finally, these failures will be set against the wider
intellectual background of ideas about probabilism and
determinism in the 19th century.
What follows is the work of an English-speaking
economist who is ignorant of German; the possible
shortcomings of this for a philosophical study of authors
who composed in German are evident.
II: Bernstein’s critique of Marx and Engels
The Calvinist without God
Bernstein’s systematic exposition of his views was
published in 1899 as Die Voraussetzungen des Socialismus;
an English translation by Edith C. Harvey was published
in 1909 under the title Evolutionary socialism, and
reprinted in 1961 and 1963. A new English translation by
Henry Tudor has recently been published under the title
The preconditions of socialism.1 Since Harvey’s translation
is the statement best known to English-speaking readers it
is unfortunate that it not only leaves out between a quarter
and third of the original, but that these omissions include
the whole of Chapter Two, ‘Marxism and the Hegelian
dialectic’, in which Bernstein presents his philosophical
critique, such as it is, of Marx and Engels. Tudor
                                                                                                                                                
1 In what follows all quotations from Bernstein’s book are from
the Tudor translation and are referenced as (Bernstein 1993);
references to Tudor’s introduction and critical apparatus are
referenced as (Tudor 1993); the names are omitted where
there appears to be no danger of ambiguity. Note that
Tudor’s translation is of the first edition (1899), not the
revised and enlarged second edition (1921).
comments that “many inaccuracies and other defects crept
in” to what Harvey did translate (1993: xi).
While leaving out philosophical considerations might be
thought appropriate for an English-language audience, it
is these which, according to Bernstein himself, constitute
the scaffolding from which the marxist scientific edifice
was constructed (1993: 199). Given the relative
unfamiliarity of this part of Bernstein’s thought, it will be
quoted extensively below.
So what is Bernstein’s notion of the materialist conception
of history? In his own words:
“The question of the correctness of the materialist
conception of history is a question of the degree of
historical necessity. To be a materialist means first of all
to assert the necessity of all events. According to the
materialist theory, matter moves of necessity in accordance
with certain laws; therefore there is no cause without its
necessary effect and no event without a material cause.
However, since the movement of matter determines the
formation of ideas and the directions of the will, these too
are necessitated, as are all human events. The materialist i s
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thus a Calvinist without God. If he does not believe in a
predestination ordained by a divinity, he does and must
believe that from any particular point in time all
subsequent events are, through the totality of the given
material and the power relations of its parts, determined
beforehand.
“The application of materialism to the interpretation of
history therefore means asserting, from the outset, the
necessity of all historical events and developments. For the
materialist, the only question is in what way necessity
manifests itself in human history, what element of force or
what factors of force speak the decisive word, what is the
relationship of the various factors of force to one another,
and what role in history falls to nature, the economy, legal
institutions, and ideas.” (1993: 13, emphasis added)
To repeat: “materialism … means … the necessity of all
historical events and developments. … [including] the
formation of ideas and the directions of the will … from
any particular point in time all subsequent events are …
determined beforehand.”
This, of course, is the doctrine of Laplace; the claim that
a sufficiently capacious mind, armed with knowledge of
fundamental physical laws and a list of the positions and
velocities of every particle in the universe at a given point
in time, could predict every detail of the future and
recapitulate every incident of the past. And as Bernstein’s
comments show, one must apparently either embrace some
variety of idealism in order to leave room for human
freedom, or be a consistent materialist and assert that all
human events are thus equally pre-determined. This
dilemma will be returned to below, where the latter
doctrine will be referred to as hyper-determinism.
Bernstein supports his interpretation of historical
materialism with a lengthy quotation from the Contribution
to the Critique of Political Economy, beginning with the
famous claim that “It is not the consciousness of men that
determines their existence, but their social existence that
determines their consciousness”, and claims that
“‘consciousness’ and ‘existence’ are so sharply opposed
that we are nearly driven to conclude that human beings are
regarded as nothing but the living agents of historical
forces whose work they carry out against their knowledge
and will” (1993: 14). And he buttresses this with Marx’s
comment, in the preface to the first volume of Capital, that
with respect to the “natural laws” of capitalist production
“it is a question of these laws themselves, of these
tendencies winning their way through and working
themselves out with iron necessity”(1976: 91).
Retreating from economic determinism?
But, having stationed Marx in this exposed position,
Bernstein himself then prudently conducts an apparent
retreat under covering fire provided by Marx’s stipulation
(1976: 91) that the laws in question are ones of tendency,
not of outcome. Bernstein also relies on Engels’ remark
that “[p]olitical, juridical, philosophical, religious,
literary, artistic, etc., development is based upon economic
development. But all these react upon one another and also
upon the economic basis”; as Bernstein comments: “[o]ne
must confess that this sounds somewhat different from the
passage from Marx quoted above” (1993: 15). The
consequence is that Engels is only claiming that “the
ultimate causes of all social transformations … [lie] in
transformations of the mode of production” (emphasis in
Bernstein’s quotation2), implying that there might be
other, secondary, causes modifying or attenuating the
ultimate ones: “the longer the series of such causes the
more limited, both qualitatively and quantitatively, is the
determining force of the ultimate causes”.
Bernstein is at pains to claim both that Marx and Engels
never “overlooked” the fact that “non-economic factors
exercise an influence on the course of history” and that
they softened their alleged reliance on the economic as the
determining force as the years passed. This then licenses
Bernstein to assert that, since “whoever employs the
materialist conception of history nowadays is duty bound
to use it in its most developed and not in its original
form”, therefore “he is duty bound to take full account of
the legal and moral concepts, the historical and religious
traditions of every epoch, geographical and other natural
influences, which include the nature of man himself and his
intellectual dispositions”, especially if the object is not to
explain history but to make predictions about the future
(1993: 16).
Retreating from hyper-determinism?
In modern society, according to Bernstein, knowledge of
economic “forces of nature” (1993: 19) transforms them
from the masters of humanity to its servants, just as has
happened with the physical ones. Only sectional interest
prevents the complete transformation of this theoretical
freedom into practice, but “even here the general interest
gains increasing strength as against private interest”.
Thus:
“ … the level of economic development reached today
leaves ideological and especially ethical factors greater
scope for independent activity than was formerly the case.
In consequence, the causal connection between technical-
economic development and the development of the other
social institutions becomes increasingly a mediated one,
and the natural necessities of the former become ever less
decisive for the formation of the latter” (1993: 19-20,
emphases added).
Now it is Bernstein who is in an exposed position, and he
allows his intellectual big guns to retreat. Although
“originally … an almost unlimited determining force was
ascribed to the technical-economic factor in history”
(1993: 21), in fact, according to Engels’ explanations
quoted above, marxist theory is not purely materialist,
much less purely economic:
“Philosophical materialism, or the materialism of the
natural sciences, is deterministic. The Marxist conception
of history is not. It assigns to the economic basis of
national life no unconditional determining influence on
the forms which that life takes.” (1993: 22)
All the above is from Bernstein’s first chapter (‘The basic
tenets of Marxist socialism’). Harvey’s translation jumps
straight from this to Bernstein’s original Chapter Three,
‘The economic development of modern society’, where he
presents his evidence for the failure of Marx’s predictions,
                                                                                                                                    
2 The first passage is from a letter to W. Borgius of 25.1.1894
(MESC, p.549, cited (1993: 15)); the second from the Anti-
Dühring (MECW, vol. XV, p 254, cited (1993: 14)).
Bernstein and Engels 3
but as previously mentioned the omitted second chapter
contains the philosophical groundwork with which
Bernstein prepares the reader to understand the reasons
for Marx’s failures as soothsayer. This he does in two
sections.
‘The pitfalls of the Hegelian dialectic’
Bernstein accurately reports Engels as adopting Hegel’s
distinction between the metaphysical and the dialectical:
the former treats things or their thought images in
isolation as objects fixed and given for all time, while the
latter “regards things in their connections, changes, and
transitions, with the result that the two poles of an
antagonism, like positive and negative, mutually penetrate
into one another”. But as Bernstein points out, while
Hegel conceives dialectic as the self-development of the
concept, with Marx and Engels the dialectic of the concept
becomes the conscious reflection of the dialectical
movement of the real world (1993: 30). However,
Bernstein claims:
“ … placing the dialectic on its feet is not as simple as
that. However things may stand in reality, as soon as we
leave the solid ground of empirically verifiable facts we enter
the world of derived concepts, and if we then follow the
laws of dialectics, as laid down by Hegel, we will, before
we know it, find ourselves once again enmeshed in ‘the self
development of concepts’. Herein lies the great danger of
the Hegelian logic of contradiction. … as soon as
developments are deductively anticipated on the basis of
these changes, the danger of arbitrary construction
begins.” (1993: 30-31, emphasis added)
In the real life of the individual, and in history, however,
“development through antagonism is accomplished neither
as easily and radically nor with the same precision and
symmetry as it is in speculative construction”3 and,
Bernstein adds: “Any Marxist nowadays would agree with
this as regards the past; but for the future, even for the very
near future, Marxist theory holds that this does not
apply.”
As an example of how a surfeit of dialectic can lead one
astray, Bernstein cites Marx and Engels’ prediction in the
Communist Manifesto that the pending bourgeois
revolution in Germany would be the prelude to an
immediately following proletarian one and contrasts it
with Engels’ later admission in the preface to The Class
Struggles in France that he and Marx had under-estimated
the time-scale of social and political development
(Bernstein 1993: 35).
Self-deception of the kind shown in the Manifesto,
according to Bernstein, is only comprehensible in
someone like Marx if it were not seen as a remnant of
Hegelian dialectics. The notion that Hegelianism in Marx
and Engels’ thought was an infantile disorder which they
never quite grew out of is reinforced by citing the rebuff
given by Engels to the so-called ‘Youngsters’ in the SDP
who clashed with reformist elements in the Party over
observing May Day. Whereas Engels had criticised the
reformists over their support for so-called steamship
subventions (state ship-building subsidies to bolster
                                                                                                                                                
3 Bernstein is quoting from F.A. Lange, The Labour Question,
3rd edn. pp 248-9 (cited 1993: 31).
colonial expansion), over May Day he condemned their
opponents’ “literary and student revolt” as being inspired
by “convulsive and distorted Marxism”. Bernstein
comments:
 “ … this ambivalence, so utterly out of character for
Engels, was ultimately rooted in the dialectic taken over
from Hegel. Its ‘yes, no and no, yes’ instead of ‘yes, yes
and no, no’, its antagonisms flowing into one another, its
transformation of quantity into quality, and all other such
dialectical delights, time and again got in the way of a
proper assessment of the significance of observed
changes.” (1993:34)
‘Marxism and Blanquism’
Bernstein notes that Hegelian philosophy can be described
as the ideological counterpart of the French Revolution, in
which “man took his stand on his head, that is, on
thought”.4 The most radical tendency in that revolution
had been that of Babeuf, whose spiritual heir in the events
of 1848 was Auguste Blanqui. But although in Germany
Blanquism was regarded as simply the theory of
insurrectionary conspiracy, according to Bernstein, that
view “stops short at externals and applies, at most, to
certain epigones of Blanqui”. Political methods are
“partly” a matter of circumstances; “where there is no
freedom of association and of the press, secret leagues are
obviously appropriate”. (1993: 38)
Blanquism is more like the theory of a method, which i s
itself merely the outcome of a deeper underlying political
theory—which is “quite simply the theory of the
immeasurable creative power of revolutionary political
force and its manifestation, revolutionary expropriation.”
To reject putsches does not amount to liberating oneself to
Blanquism.
Marx and Engels’ writings of the period illustrate this
perfectly; although they reject putsches, “they are
permeated throughout with what is, in the last analysis, a
Blanquist or Babouvist spirit”. The only socialist
literature that escapes criticism in The Communist
Manifesto are the writings of Babeuf, and the programme
of revolutionary action set out there is Blanquist through
and through (1993: 38-9).
However, the worst outbreak of Blanquism in Marx and
Engels’ work is in “the circular to the Communist League
of March 1850 with its exact instructions as to how the
communists, in the imminent re-eruption of the
Revolution, must draw on every possible resource to make
this revolution ‘permanent’. All theoretical insight into
the nature of the modern economy … all economic
understanding vanishes to nothing before a programme so
illusory it could have been set up by any run-of-the-mill
revolutionary” (emphasis added). Marx and Engels made
mere will into the driving force of the revolution,
according to Bernstein.
This might be excused as simply the kind of over-reaction
which is apt to grip people in exile, but although such
considerations might explain exaggerations in
presentation, “it can not explain that glaring opposition
between programme and reality” (1993:40) This was in
                                                                                                                    
4 Bernstein is quoting from Hegel’s The Philosophy of History;
the translation is due to Tudor (1993: 37, footnote).
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fact the product of “an intellectual defect, of a dualism in
their theory”.
Bernstein claims that there are two main streams in “the
modern socialist movement”; one which “starts from the
proposals for reform worked out by socialist thinkers”
and is aimed at construction, and one which “derives its
inspiration from popular revolutionary upheavals” aimed
at destruction. According to the possibilities inherent in
the conditions of the time, he says, the first appears as
“utopian, sectarian, peacefully evolutionary”, the second
as “conspiratorial, demagogic, terroristic”. (1993: 40)
Historical development shows more and more clearly that
the first seeks the emancipation of the workers through
economic organisation, whereas the second seeks
emancipation through political expropriation of the ruling
class. And Marxism is an uneasy compromise between the
two, which accounts for the fact that it “repeatedly and at
frequent intervals appears in a different guise. These are
not differences … produced as changing circumstances
require changing tactics: they … appear spontaneously
without any compelling external necessity, merely as the
product of inner contradictions.” (1993: 41)
Not only this, but “[e]very time we see the doctrine which
proceeds from the economy as the basis of historical
development capitulate before the theory which stretches
the cult of force to its limits, we find a Hegelian principle.
… The great illusion of Hegelian dialectic is that it i s
never entirely in the wrong. … Is it a contradiction to put
force in the place so recently occupied by the economy? Oh
no it isn’t, because force is itself ‘an economic power’!”
III: Critique of Bernstein
Falsification of the ‘falsifications’
It is a methodological error to scrap potentially fruitful
theories purely because of apparent early falsification of
their predictions; but when theories are falsified as
rapidly, spectacularly and as consistently as were
Bernstein’s one cannot avoid the conclusion that their
foundations are shaky.
The German state, where universal suffrage was the
terror of the junkers (1993: 144) and would thus lead to
the gradual abolition of class rule (142), launched an
imperialist world war just 15 years later5; the cartels,
whose development was supposed to hold back capitalism’s
inbuilt tendency to crisis (84), hindered neither hyper-
inflation nor depression; the middle classes—which
instead of withering away (60-1) were to be conciliated
(147) and won over to social democracy (158)—saw their
savings wiped out and backed Hitler.6
What are the sources of Bernstein’s errors?
First of all, it has to be said that Bernstein is less than
happy in his use of his material. For example, in arguing
that industry shows no tendency to increasing
concentration Bernstein says that “for a long time, in the
canton of Zurich, domestic weaving … declined” (1993:
69). Later, however, between 1891 and 1897 domestic
                                                                                                                
5 At the close of which Bernstein participated in the SDP
government which presided over the repression of the
German revolution. In The preconditions he had written that
“[p]articularly in Germany, on the day after a revolution
anything but a purely Social Democratic government would
be an impossibility. A…compromise government composed of
bourgeois democrats and socialists would, for all practical
purposes, mean either that a couple of the former were
included as decoration in a socialist government or that social
democracy had surrendered to bourgeois democracy. At a
time of revolution, this surely a most improbable
combination.” (1993: 45)
6 Bernstein said that he regarded “the bourgeoisie, including
the German, as being, on the whole, in a fairly healthy state,
not only economically but also morally.” (1993: 147, footnote).
A pathetic note is struck by his last extant letter (to Kautsky, 23
January 1932):  “[T]he great economic depression has created
a general world crisis, our enemies may…make common cause
at the decisive moment”. (Gay 1952: 297)
weavers increased from 24,708 to 27,800, while
employment in mechanised mills increased “only from
11,840 to 14,550”. As a moment’s calculation shows, the
domestic sector increased by 12.5 per cent, while the
mechanised one grew by “only” 22.9 per cent.7
                                                                                                                                                
7 This is not an isolated example. Bernstein also appeals to the
following data (Table 1) on the structure of employment in
German industry to illustrate his claims about the (non-)
concentration of industry (1993: 71).
1882 1895 % increase
Small (1-5) 2,457,950 3,056,318 24.3
Small/medium (6-10) 500,097 833,409 66.6
Larger/medium (11-50) 891,623 1,620,848 81.8
Total, small and
medium firms
3,849,670 5,510,575
Big (>50) not stated not stated 88.7
Table 1: Number of employees in German companies
Although Bernstein admits that this shows employment in
large industry increasing faster than in small, he alleges that
because the total population increased by only 13.5 per cent
the faster growth of large-scale industry did not mean the
absorption of smaller companies. Actually what this fact
implies is that a larger proportion of the population was swept
into industry, which in turn shows in a curious light
Bernstein’s efforts to demonstrate that the peasantry is
flourishing (1993: 73ff).
If one considers the shares in industrial employment in smaller
firms claimed by the three sectors, of course, very small
industry is evidently declining relative to medium-sized
significance (Table 2).
1882 1895 % change
Small (1-5) 63.8 55.5 -8.3
Small/medium (6-10) 13.0 15.1 +2.1
Larger/medium (11-50) 23.2 29.4 +6.2
Table 2: Employment in small and medium companies
as percentage of total for sector
To support his various contentions Bernstein brings forward a
mass of quantitative evidence. Much of it is omitted from the
Harvey translation, including the Swiss example given in the
main text, but not the German employment data just cited,
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Rather more spectacular than this incompetence with
percentages is what he clearly regards as the clincher to his
claims about the non-concentration of capitalist industry,
namely the failure of this tendency in ‘England’.8
Since this country is admitted by all to be “the most
advanced in terms of capitalist development”, its failure to
fulfil Marx’s predictions would clearly be telling evidence
against their validity, and Bernstein produces various
statistics to indicate that “[t]he ‘workshop of the world’ i s
… still far from having fallen prey to large-scale industry
to anything like the degree that is often supposed. … no
major class is disappearing from the scale” (1993: 66-7).
And, in a footnote, Bernstein adds that this evidence of
non-concentration in Britain is lent added credence by the
testimony of German workers who, on emigrating to
Britain, are astonished—at its backwardness in this respect
compared with Germany!9
“Begging the question” is not a rare error in
argumentation: but there cannot be very many cases of
authors smuggling the negation of their desired conclusion
into their premises.
For someone who rejects dialectics for something more
cut-and-dried—“yes, yes and no, no”10—Bernstein’s
grasp of traditional logic is not impressive. Indeed, the
whole basis of his argument against Marx and Engels is a
logical muddle.
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
nor the comparison of British and German industry dealt
with below. It might be an instructive, if tedious, exercise to
go through it all in a similar manner as done here.
8 Despite years living there, he is unaware of any distinction
between the British state and its constituent territories.
9 “[They] have repeatedly expressed their astonishment to me
at the fragmentation of businesses they have encountered in
the wood, metal, etc., manufacturing industries” (1993: 67).
And on the next page Bernstein writes that “In Prussia and in
the rest of Germany, the creation of large-scale industry has
been accomplished with extraordinary speed. While various
branches of large-scale industry (including the textile
industry) still lag behind England, others (machines and tools)
have on average reached the English position, and some have
overtaken it (the chemical and glass industries, certain
branches of the printing trade, and probably also electrical
engineering).”
10 When it suits him, however, Bernstein is not averse to
amputating the first and last words quoted here.
 Summing up his version of Marx’s predictions (“fall in the rate
of profit…overproduction and crises…destruction of
capital…concentration…of capital…increase in the rate of
surplus value”), Bernstein asks: is all this correct? To which
the answer is: “Yes and no.…The forces…exist, and they
operate in the given direction.…If the picture does not agree
with reality, then it is not because anything false has been
said but because what is said is incomplete. Factors which
have a limiting effect…are…though dealt with here and
there…abandoned when the established facts are summed
up and compared” (1993: 57, emphasis added).
In other words Bernstein does not dare contradict the master
directly but is prepared to mutter under his breath. Once
again we may note Bernstein’s positivist, not to say positively
Machian, belief that science is just a matter of collecting up
“empirically-verifiable facts” and comparing them.
Bernstein fails to notice that his arguments against
economic determinism are not arguments against
determinism, but merely against its having an exclusively
economic aspect. Nor does he notice that if hyper-
determinism is true, insisting on economic determinism is
either:
(i) false, if the hand of fate rules our history only through
the physical events which we experience as ideas about law,
ethics, religion, and so on
(ii) arbitrary, if fate also rules through our interaction
with the means of production or through the events which
we experience as ideas about markets or other economic
relationships
(iii) redundant, if fate only rules by economic routes.
By similar reasoning, emphasising any other route (legal,
ethical, etc.) for determinism is also false, arbitrary or
redundant, just in case hyper-determinism is true (there is,
of course, a more fundamental redundancy involved in
discussing these issues if hyper-determinism is true, but
for obvious reasons this is not worth pursuing).
Moreover, although Bernstein makes a number of
statements which are in conflict with hyper-determinism,
he never presents any argument against it as such.
This is because Bernstein himself was fatally ambivalent
on the question of determinism in general.
Arguing against Blanquism
Although he claims to be against (exclusively) economic
determinism, and claims that with the further development
of society mankind will be able to take a conscious decision
to repeal the economic laws of capitalism in favour of
socialism, Bernstein’s own case in fact relies on at least
some fairly strong version of economic determinism to be
coherent.
How is this? Recall that while (at any rate, the early) Marx
and Engels are at first accused of excessive (“technico-”)
economic determinism and of failing to take account of
legal and ethical factors, a few pages later their crime has
become that of revolutionary over-enthusiasm, in the form
of claiming that force is itself an economic power.
Since Bernstein cannot, without inconsistency, claim that
the Blanquist error lies in supposing that acts of will as
such are impotent, he clearly needs an argument to show
that whatever their future potency, their time has not yet
come.
What is this argument? Essentially that:
(i) capitalism will not force such a choice on society
(because of the failure and unfoundedness of Marx’s
various predictions (capitalist crisis, immiseration, etc.)
(ii) the capitalist system has not yet developed the
economy and society sufficiently for the wilful transition to
socialism to be feasible in the foreseeable future.
In short, Bernstein’s revisionist theory is just as
economically deterministic as he claims Marx and Engels’
to be; the only differences are the time-scale (by
implication) and the nature of the choice that will
eventually face humanity (and hence the nature of its
decision).
Rosa Luxemburg, in her response to Bernstein’s book,
pointed out that any new movement “begins by suiting
itself to the forms already at hand, and by speaking the
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language which was spoken” (Selected Political Writings,
p.134, cited by Tudor, 1993: xxxi).
With this insight, recall that Bernstein, as we have seen,
begins his account of historical materialism with the claim
that the materialist “does and must believe that from any
particular point in time all subsequent events are …
determined beforehand”.
As noted above, this hyper-determinism is the doctrine of
Laplace. It is worth giving Laplace’s version in full:
“All events, even those which on account of their
insignificance do not seem to follow the great laws of
nature, are a result of it just as necessarily as the
revolutions of the sun. … Given for one instant an
intelligence which could comprehend all the forces by
which nature is animated and the respective situation of the
beings who compose it—an intelligence sufficiently vast to
submit these data to analysis—it would embrace in the
same formula the movements of the greatest bodies of the
universe and those of the lightest atom; for it, nothing
would be uncertain and the future, as the past, would be
present to its eyes.” (Philosophical Essay on Probabilities, pp
3-4, cited Hacking (1990: 11))
Is this “the language that was spoken” on the subject of
necessity? Apparently it was, since according to
Kolakowski (1978, Vol. II: 111) Bernstein’s
philosophical critique (which Kolakowski describes as
“trite and lacking in understanding”11) played a very small
part in the polemics against him, with the exception of
Plekhanov (1978: Vol. II, 348).
Consider the content of Luxemburg’s own reply to
Bernstein. Effectively she accepts his characterisation of
historical materialism as determinism with her claim that
Bernstein’s “idealism” is the result of denying that
capitalism leads to inevitable collapse. By idealism she
means that denying the “objective necessity” of socialism –
which constitutes its scientific character – leaves it as
merely a rational possibility which can be made a matter of
moral commitment; thus Bernstein offered “an idealist
explanation of socialism” (SPW pp. 58 and 59, cited
Tudor 1993: xxxii and xxxiii).
Tudor argues that while Bernstein was simply denying
that the desirability of socialism could be established
scientifically, Luxemburg thought that the defects of
capitalism had to be demonstrated by capitalism itself, and
that it had to do this by demonstrating its inability to carry
on.
In The Accumulation of Capital Luxemburg writes that the
ultimate aim of the accumulation process is “to establish
the exclusive and universal domination of capitalist
                                                                                                    
11 Kolakowski’s prejudices make his evaluations unreliable,
even as a negative guide. His overall approach to marxism is
the same as Bernstein’s – he wishes to preserve and commend
Marx’s intellectual contributions in special subjects
(philosophy for Kolakowski, sociology for Bernstein), while
deprecating the inferences drawn from them by practical
revolutionaries.
Since Kolakowski had the dubious advantage of being a
professional academic in a country controlled by Stalinists his
prejudices take a predictable form: the nearer to power a
particular thinker, the less reliable is Kolakowski’s account.
production in all countries and for all branches of
industry.
“Yet this argument does not lead anywhere. As soon as
this final result is achieved—in theory, of course, because
it can never actually happen—accumulation must come to a
stop. The realisation and capitalisation of surplus value
become impossible to accomplish. Just as soon as reality
begins to correspond to Marx’s diagram of enlarged
reproduction, the end of accumulation is in sight, it has
reached its limits, and capitalist production is in extremis.
For capital, the standstill of accumulation means that the
development of the productive forces is arrested, and the
collapse of capitalism follows inevitably, as an objective
historical necessity.” ([1913] 1951: 417)
Thus capitalism is “the first mode of economy which i s
unable to exist by itself” and “[a]lthough it strives to
become universal, and indeed, on account of this tendency,
it must break down—because it is immanently incapable of
becoming a universal form of production.” (1951: 467)
What Luxemburg wants to prove by this is quite clear:
that social development is governed by inevitable laws of
economics which predict the automatic breakdown of
capitalism, just as Bernstein claims is entailed by
historical materialism12. Moreover it is noteworthy that
this is an entirely different breakdown theory to that
attacked by Bernstein, which relies on bigger and better
busts in the trade cycle, and which Luxemburg dismisses:
“[I]n spite of the sharp rises and falls in the course of a
cycle, in spite of crises, the needs of society are always
satisfied more or less, reproduction continues on its
complicated course, and productive capacities develop
progressively. … The attempt to solve the problem of
reproduction in terms of the periodical character of crises
is fundamentally a device of vulgar economics, just like the
attempt to solve the problem of value in terms of
fluctuations in demand and supply.” ([1913] 1951: 36)
Kolakowski’s survey (all references are to 1978 Vol. II)
also suggests that Kautsky (35), Lafargue (144), Labriola
(180), Adler (272), Plekhanov (338), and Lenin (454)
among others were all committed to some version of
determinism – in Lafargue’s case to the extreme version
implied by Bernstein’s account; namely, that since all
human behaviour is subject to determinism, free will is a
delusion.
The only exception he finds is the obscure Stanislaw
Brzozowski (219), who explicitly combated determinism
and held that “[t]here was not a single concept, vision or
method which, in the transfer from Marx’s mind to
Engels’, did not become completely different, and indeed
diametrically opposite as far as the philosophical nature of
concepts is concerned” (cited 224).
Turning from intellectual history to practical politics,
we may note the testimony of Bertrand Russell. In a series
                                                                                                                                
12 It is irrelevant that Luxemburg’s argument, even granted
her eccentric premises about the extra-capitalist source of
surplus value, is incoherent: if capitalism relies on a non-
capitalist sphere for its existence, but its unwitting efforts to
destroy itself by becoming universal “can never actually
happen”, it is unclear how or why the predicted breakdown is
to take place.
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of six Fabian lectures13 in 1896 Russell offered an account
of the past history and present activities of the SPD, the
latter clearly informed by first-hand observation in
Germany. Russell’s discussion of Marx is so slight as to be
laughable14 but his account of German social democracy in
action is a lively and—where he is giving eye-witness
testimony—convincing one (see for example pages 119 and
125). As an invincible pragmatist, Russell is able to spot
what it took others several more years of bitter experience
to realise: that the party was already largely reformist in
substance if not in form. This is Russell’s account of the
cast of mind produced in party members by their
conception of marxist doctrine:
“Marx’s doctrine is thus in a theoretical sense
revolutionary, to a degree never attained by any former
theory of the world. But practically, the revolutionary
                                                                                                        
13 Bernstein apparently discovered the shortcomings of Marx
and Engels while giving a Fabian lecture in 1897 (Tudor 1993:
xix). His topic was the always-rash one, “What Marx really
taught”.
14 He sums up Capital as “tedious economico-Hegelian
pedantry” (1896: 10), and opines that “the two later volumes
add little to Marx’s system” (1896: 15, footnote); the 25 pages
he devotes to expounding Marx bear a striking resemblance in
their concerns to Bernstein’s critique, although much more
philistine in expression.
Also like Bernstein (who, incidentally, doesn’t get a single
mention, in spite of his years of heroic exile), Russell’s aversion
to dialectics goads him into incoherence: “the average, by
definition, lies half-way between the best and the worst”
(1896: 19, footnote). This seems to be neither the mean nor
the median.
tendency is neutralised and held in check by the other quality
of development, also due to the dialectic method, the
quality of inherent necessity and fatality. All change is due to
an immanent principle in the actual order of things; in
Hegelian phrase this order contains contradictions, which
lead to its final ruin by a new order, in turn to suffer a
similar disruption and euthanasia. Nothing, therefore, can
hinder the predetermined march of events; the present
logically involves the future, and produces it from its own
inherent unrest. This fatalism, more than all else, gives to
social democracy its religious faith and power; this inspires
patience, and controls the natural inclination to forcible
revolution. There is an almost oriental tinge in the belief,
shared by all orthodox Marxians, that capitalist society is
doomed, and the advent of the communist state
foreordained necessity. As a fighting force, as an appeal to
men’s whole emotional nature, Social Democracy gains
inestimable strength from this belief, which keeps it sober
and wise through all difficulties, and inspires its workers
with unshakeable confidence in the ultimate victory of their
cause.” (1986: 6, emphases added)
Thus it seems that Bernstein very largely was “speaking
the language that was spoken”, and in more than one
respect.
However, it is the contention of this paper that (i) what
Bernstein and virtually all the other participants had in
common was that they failed to realise that what they were
speaking was not the language of Marx and Engels. Hence
(ii) what Bernstein attempted to revise was not marxism,
and (iii) what he ended up with was not a revision of the
notions he appeared to attack.
IV: ‘Calvinism without God’?
Fit for the boldest bourgeois
Bernstein claims that the materialist is necessarily “a
Calvinist without God”, in that this viewpoint requires
hyper-determinism. In a footnote, Tudor comments that
“[t]his reads like an unacknowledged quotation from
Engels” but that he cannot find the source. (1993: 13)
If such a quotation were to be found which turned out to
support the sense of Bernstein’s argument it would be
interestingly extraordinary, since the best-known texts
make it clear that Engels had nothing but contempt for
hyper-determinism philosophically:
“[D]eterminism … has passed from French materialism
into natural science, and … tries to dispose of chance by
denying it altogether. According to this conception only
simple, direct necessity prevails in nature. That a
particular pea-pod contains five peas and not four or six …
that this year a particular clover flower was fertilised … by
precisely one particular bee and at a particular time … have
been produced by … an unshatterable necessity of such a
nature indeed that the gaseous sphere, from which the
solar system was derived, was already so constituted that
these events had to happen thus and not otherwise. With
this kind of necessity we … do not get away from the
theological conception of nature. Whether with Augustine
and Calvin we call it the eternal decree of God, or Kismet
as the Turks do, or whether we call it necessity, is all
pretty much the same for science. There is no question of
tracing the chain of causation in any of these cases; so we
are just as wise in one as in another, the so-called necessity
remains an empty phrase, and with it—chance also remains
what it was before.” (1940: 231-2)
This excerpt from the Dialectics of Nature not only shows
Engels’ rejection of hyper-determinism, but also shows
him clearly associating it with Calvin. Now it might be
objected that Dialectics of Nature was not published until
1927—but of course Bernstein as Engels’ literary executor
had the manuscript in his possession15 at the time when he
was revising marxism (1896-9). Further, Bernstein had the
advantage, which others did not, of being able to converse
with Engels personally and frequently, and so might
reasonably be expected to know what the latter’s views
really were.
In any case, it is incomprehensible why Bernstein might
have thought that being embraced by a religious leader
                                                                                                                    
15 He did not get round to getting it refereed till 1924, when
he sent it, or part of it, to Einstein. It seems that Einstein saw
only the chapter on electricity, causing him to say that it was
not of great interest to modern physics, but should on the
whole be published (J.B.S. Haldane’s Preface to Dialectics of
Nature; 1940: xiv).
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such as Calvin was a quality likely to adorn a doctrine
serving the cause of proletarian revolution, especially
given that Engels regarded it as the ideal doctrine for a
rising bourgeois class:
“Calvin’s creed was one fit for the boldest of the
bourgeoisie of his time. His predestination doctrine was
the religious expression of the fact that in the commercial
world success or failure does not depend upon a man’s
activity or cleverness, but on circumstances uncontrollable
by him. It is not of him that willeth or of him that runneth,
but of the mercy of unknown economic powers; and this
was especially true at a period of economic revolution,
when all old commercial routes and centres were replaced
by new ones, when India and America were opened to the
world, and when even the most sacred economic articles of
faith—the value of gold and silver—began to totter and
break down.” (1976: 437)
There is no question of t h i s  being unknown to
Bernstein—for he himself quotes this passage in his
Cromwell and communism (1980: 28-9).16 On the other
hand we may concede that an inattentive reading of this
passage might see it as support for economic
determinism—but note that Engels is merely discussing
the problems of life in “the commercial world”, not the
metaphysical status of the economic with respect to a
science of history: we shall see in a moment the
significance of Engels’ reference to “unknown economic
powers”.
Engels’ arguments above show that he is against
necessity, at least in the form of hyper-determinism. They
do not show exactly what it is he is for. His complaint about
“degrading necessity to the production of chance” could
be simply about the slipshod and complacent outlook that
proclaims universal determinism but is
(i) too dogmatic to acknowledge that in considering
particular systems some aspects of their determination may
be just irrelevant, and
(ii) too idle to produce the goods when called for.
In other words, this passage could be read as a demand
for a more rigorous fulfilment of the hyper-determinist
programme, with causal chains supplied for every event (or
at least every class of event).
More unsympathetically, it could be read as
equivocation—willing to pour scorn on an uncongenial
outlook that is vulnerable to criticism, unwilling to admit
that that same outlook is apparently required by a
consistent materialism such as Engels proclaims—in
which case one might sympathise with Bernstein’s
association of historical materialism with predestination,
                                                                                                                                                
16 Bernstein cites it as from an article on ‘Historical
materialism’, Neue Zeit 1892-3, vol. i, pp 43-4. Exactly the same
passage occurs in Engels' introduction to the English edition of
Socialism: utopian and scientific, the popular pamphlet formed
from three chapters of the Anti-Dühring (reproduced as an
appendix in the 1976 edition of the Anti-Dühring referred to in
this paper: the quotation appears on pages 437-8). This
pamphlet was originally produced at the request of Lafargue
(Engels 1976: 425), whom we have met above. Apparently he
too either did not listen to, did not take notice of, or did not
understand what was said to him.
especially given Engels’ notorious comment about freedom
being the recognition of necessity.
However, this remark, examined in its context, is clearly
no more than the point that ignorance of natural laws
leaves us at their mercy whereas knowledge of them makes
us their master, in the sense that we can—for
example—exploit the law of gravity by building a hot air
balloon (“Freedom does not consist in an imaginary
freedom from natural laws, but in the knowledge of these
laws and in the possibility which is thus given of
systematically making them work towards definite ends.”
(1976: 144)).
Even more importantly, we are told that Bernstein was
converted first to socialism by reading Dühring’s
masterpiece, and then to marxism by reading the Anti-
Dühring (Gay 1952: 24-26).17 If so, Bernstein’s errors are
even less excusable, for the passage in question is explicitly
for the purpose of criticising Dühring’s attack on “silly
delusions of inner freedom”:
“All false theories of freedom must be replaced by what
we know from experience is the nature of the relations
between rational judgement on the one hand and instinctive
impulses on the other, a relation which so to speak unites
them into a single mean force.” (Cited by Engels: 143,
emphasis in Engels)
To which Engels replies:
“On this basis freedom consists in rational judgement
pulling a man to the left while irrational impulses pull him
to the left, and in this parallelogram of forces the actual
movement follows the direction of the diagonal. Freedom
would therefore be the mean between judgement and
impulse, between reason and unreason, and its degree in
each individual case could be determined on the basis of
experience by a ‘personal equation’, to use an astronomical
expression.”18
Engels then cites Dühring’s alternative theory of
freedom (“freedom … means nothing more to us than
susceptibility to conscious motives in accordance with our
natural and acquired intelligence. All such motives operate
with the inevitability of natural law, … but it is precisely
on this unavoidable compulsion that we rely when we apply
the moral levers”) to which the passage about freedom
being the recognition of necessity cited above is a reply.
Not “freedom from natural laws, but … knowledge of
these laws and … making them work towards definite
ends” in Engels’ words. How does this differ from
Bernstein’s conception of the possibility of ending or
evading economic determinism thorough knowledge of
economic laws? Evidently the point is simply plagiarised
from Engels, who is then implicitly accused (through the
business about Calvin) of asserting exactly the opposite!
                                                                                                                                                
17 See also Gay 1952: 94-103 for a detailed account of this
episode. It appears that Bernstein’s one and only personal
encounter with Dühring played a rôle in the cure.
18 “Personal equations” are statistical statements used to
describe the pattern of variation in each astronomer’s
observations, introduced by (and summing up) the
individual’s particular shortcomings in steadiness of eye and
hand. The remark is interesting in demonstrating Engels'
familiarity with at least one probabilistic model.
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Even worse is Bernstein’s accusation that Marx and Engels
claimed that “force is an economic power”. Here is what
Engels actually has to say on the topic—again, from the
Anti-Dühring:
“The rôle played in history by force as contrasted with
economic development is … clear. … Either it works in the
sense and in the direction of normal economic
development. In this case no conflict arises between them,
and economic development is accelerated. Or it works
against economic development, in which case, with but few
exceptions, force succumbs to it. … where … the internal
state power of a country becomes antagonistic to its
economic development, as occurred at a certain stage with
almost every political power in the past, the contest always
ended with the downfall of the political power. Inexorably
and without exception economic development has forced its
way through.” (1976: 234-5)
Of course, Engels is here considering the use of state
power to hold back society, not to push it on; one could
still consistently assert the effectiveness of revolutionary
political force (although this is hardly the sort of
consideration to appeal to Bernstein).
Nonetheless one cannot assert that Engels unequivocally
maintained that “force is an economic power” (as he says
that it is impotent as a force for reaction). Indeed
Bernstein might well have used this passage to support his
early contention that Marx and Engels laid excessive
weight on economic determination—“inexorably and
without exception economic development has forced its way
through”—but then, of course, it would make them appear
to support his views about the inevitability of gradualism,
and Bernstein would appear less innovative.
So it seems clear that Engels is against necessity in the
hyper-determinist sense: it is still not really clear what he
is for. In other words, what does he mean by chance?
However, one does sense that he understands both the
problem of free will for consistent materialism—namely
show at least how it is consistent with known physical
laws—and the implications of this problem in an era when
all known physical laws implied strict determinism.
In the Dialectics of Nature there are some enigmatic
remarks on Hegel’s view of the relation between chance
and necessity:
“In contrast to both conceptions, [of necessity and
chance] Hegel came forward with the hitherto quite
unheard of propositions that the accidental has a cause
because it is accidental, and just as much also has no cause
because it is accidental, that necessity determines itself as
chance, and, on the other hand, this chance is rather
absolute necessity.” (1940: 233; Engels cites Hegel’s
Logic, II, Book III, 2: Reality)
Engels thus condemns both those who regard a thing as
“either accidental or necessary, but not both at once” and
“the hardly less thoughtless mechanical determinism
which by a phrase denies chance in general only to
recognise it in practice in each particular case.” (1940:
234)
However, living before the era of quantum physics,
Engels was clearly unhappy with the idea that some events
might be only accidental: the outcome of pure randomness,
and its consequence that even extremely unlikely events are
not logically forbidden by the relevant physical laws.19
While “[c]hance overthrows necessity, as conceived
hitherto” the attempt to maintain Laplacean determinism
“means to deny thereby all inner necessity in living nature,
it means generally to proclaim the chaotic kingdom of
chance to be the sole law of living nature.” (1940: 234,
emphasis added). This notion of chance harks back to older
conceptions which will be returned to below.
What Bernstein might have made of this, had he read it or
discussed it with Engels, one can only guess. But his
antipathy to dialectics must suggest that if he was aware of
this part of Engels’ thought he was either simply mystified
by it, or suspected that it was just metaphysical fudge.20
                                                                                                                                                
19 Nor was Engels’ annotator Haldane: “Science is now
beginning to tackle these questions in connection with
quantum mechanics, and will doubtless find a way of
expressing them less paradoxically than Hegel's. Meanwhile
there seems to be little doubt that many of the laws of
ordinary physics are statistical consequences of chance events
in atoms. But these chance events are necessary, because,
though we cannot predict what a given atom will do, we can
predict how many out of a large number will go through a
given process.” (footnote, 1940: 233).
In fact, all we can say is approximately what proportion of a
large number will go through a given process in a given time
interval, on a large number of the occasions on which we
check. If an ice-cube forms spontaneously in one’s bath
water, all one can say is that one has witnessed an extremely
unlikely event. What might, with some intellectual juggling,
be claimed to be necessary are the macro-level laws derivable
from the micro-level ones—see for example Watkins (1984:
225-246) Chapter Six, ‘Deductivism and statistical
explanation’.
Oddly, Haldane—who normally bends over backwards to
applaud Engels’ discoveries of dialectical principles in
nature—passes up the chance to claim that the practical
certainty of macro-level laws in the face of micro-level
indeterminacy represents an example of the transformation of
quantity into quality.
20 The difference between Bernstein’s conception of necessity
and that of real historical materialism (as opposed to
Bernstein’s caricature of it) is aptly summed up by a passage
from Lenin:
“The objectivist speaks of the necessity of a given historical
process; the materialist gives an exact picture of the given
social-economic formation and of the antagonistic relations to
which it gives rise. When demonstrating the necessity of a
given series of facts, the objectivist always runs the risk  of
becoming an apologist for these facts: the materialist discloses
the class contradictions and in doing so defines his
standpoint. The objectivist speaks of ‘insurmountable
historical tendencies’; the materialist speaks of the class which
‘directs’ the given economic system, giving rise to such and
such forces of counteraction by other classes. Thus, on the
one hand, the materialist is more consistent than the
objectivist, and gives profounder and fuller effect to his
objectivism. He does not limit himself to speaking of the
necessity of a process, but ascertains exactly what social-
economic formation gives the process its content, exactly what
class determines this necessity….On the other hand,
materialism includes partisanship, so to speak, and enjoins the
direct and open adoption of the standpoint of a definite social
group in any assessment of events.”
 ‘The economic content of Narodism (etc.)’, Collected Works, I
(Moscow 1963), pp 400f; cited by Suchting (1979: 34).
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Yet the key is in his hand—among the passages from
Engels which he cites (1993: 15) to show that Marx and
Engels’ economic determinism was decidedly qualified, is
one to the following effect: legal forms, political or
religious ideas affect historical conflicts and may even
“predominate in determining their form … Thus there are
… innumerable intersecting forces, an infinite series of
parallelograms of fore which give rise to one result—the
historical event. … For what each individual wills i s
obstructed by everyone else, and what emerges is
something that no one willed.” (emphases in Bernstein21)
                                                                                                                                                
21 Letter to J. Bloch, 21-22.9.1890; MESC, p.499 (Tudor 1993:
“What each individual wills is obstructed by everyone
else, and what emerges is something that no one willed.” A
clearer statement of how it is that social processes acquire
the appearance of natural law, even though they may be the
product of indefinitely many acts of individual free will,
one hardly hopes to meet.22
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
15). Bernstein cites this from Sozialistischen Akademiker,
October 1895.
22 A vulgarised version of this, of course, is the stock-in-trade
of Austrian economics.
V: The intellectual background to determinism and probability
Pre-19th century: chance and the mob
Before the early years of the 19th century, the notion of
chance had the stigma of mobbish superstition; Hacking
(1990) cites Hume (“‘tis commonly allowed by
philosophers that what the vulgar call chance is nothing
but a secret and conceal’d cause”), Kant (it is “necessary
that everything that happens should be inexorably
determined by natural laws”) and de Moivre, who we will
examine in a moment.23 Probability was simply a
measurement of our ignorance of destiny’s outcomes,
which explains the otherwise paradoxical fact that
Laplace’s classic statement of hyper-determinism comes in
a “philosophical essay” on probability.
De Moivre’s version is especially interesting. He first
asserts that “Chance, in atheistical writings or discourse,
is a sound utterly insignificant: It imports no
determinations to any mode of Existence; nor indeed to
Existence, more than to non-existence; it can neither be
defined nor understood: nor can any Proposition
concerning it be either affirmed or denied, excepting this
one, ‘That it is a mere word’.”
De Moivre—a French Protestant exiled to England after
the revocation of the Edict of Nantes—believed that
statistical regularities (he had in mind such things as the
stability of the sex ratio in new-born children) exhibited
the wisdom of God’s plan for the universe, no less than did
Newton’s laws and all the other fruits of late 17th century
learning. Perhaps not surprisingly he demonstrates
antipathy not just to chance, but also to the notion of
essential change of any kind.
“[S]uch Laws, as well as the original Design and Purpose
of the establishment, must All be from without; the Inertia
of matter, and the nature of all created Beings, rendering it
impossible that any thing should modify its own essence,
or give to itself, or to any thing else, an original
determination or propensity. And hence, if we blind not
ourselves with metaphysical dust, we shall be led, by a
                                                                                                                    
23 The Hume quotation is from the Treatise of Human nature
(cited Hacking 1990: 12); that from Kant from the Foundations
of the metaphysics of morals (cited Hacking 199: 12).
If one suspected Bernstein of any deep knowledge of Kant,
one might see in the quotation above an explanation of the
fact that Bernstein never explicitly argues against or rejects
hyper-determinism.
short and obvious way, to the acknowledgement of the
great Maker and Governour of all: Himself all-wise, all-
powerful and good.”24
One is struck by the resemblance of this to Bernstein’s
hostility to the “self-development of concepts” and “other
Hegelian delights”.
Kant—whose spirit Bernstein called on in his struggle to
rectify marxist usage: ‘Kant against cant’ (1993:
189ff)—was more cautious.
Although “it is evident that the manifestations of this
[freedom of the] will, viz. human actions, are as much
under the control of universal laws of nature as any other
physical phenomena”, nonetheless events such as deaths,
births, and marriages “are separately dependent on the
freedom of the human will”. However, “viewed in their
connection and as the actions of the human species and not
of independent beings … the yearly registers of these
events in great countries prove that they go on with as
much conformity to the laws of nature as the oscillations of
the weather.” (emphasis added 25)
So much for Bernstein’s intellectual affiliations; this
recalls Engels, and the way in which the exercise of
everyone’s will results in what is willed by no one.
The 19th century: social statistics
Given a background in which learned opinion regarded it
as axiomatic that there existed a definite and fully
determined nature waiting to be known, the discovery in
the early and middle 19th century of a host of social
regularities naturally caused consternation. Regularity in
birth ratios or death rates could be attributed to God’s
beneficent provision or the working of impersonal
physical laws as taste suggested, without much difference
to what one believed about society.
But the discovery of stable proportions in the numbers of
suicides, murders, marriages or burglaries caused a crisis.
The determinism inherent in “French materialism”
                                                                                                                                                
24 From De Moivre’s The doctrine of chances page 251-2; cited in
Pearson (1978: 161).
25 I. Kant (1784) ‘Idee zu einer allgemein Geshichte in
Weltbürgerlicher Absicht’, translated by L.W. Beck as ‘Idea
for a universal history from a cosmopolitan point of view’ in
Kant On History (Indianapolis, 1963); cited Hacking 1990: 15.
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suggested that these statistical regularities must be a sign
that forces as irresistible as those which kept the planets in
their orbits must govern them. The variation from year to
year would thus be the result of errors, detected or
undetected, in the observational set-up, just as “personal
equations” measured the idiosyncrasies of fallible human
astronomers.
Since the learned cherished the impression of their own
free will at least as strongly as they did that of their
learning’s superiority to the outlook of the mob, this was
distressing.
Controversy ensued between those who drew the
conclusion that free will was indeed an illusion—statistical
fatalism—and those who dissented. Hacking (1990: 127ff)
notes an interesting correlation in this: those who believed
in the beneficial working of the invisible hand in Adam
Smith’s regime of “perfect liberty” went along with
statistical fatalism (we have seen above Engels views on this
connection in Calvin). But in the empire of “national
economy”, the administrators of Prussia’s statistical
bureaucracy deplored Queteletismus (the Belgian pioneer
had written that “society … prepares the crimes and the
guilty person is only the instrument”26) and maintained
their belief in free will.
Interestingly Engel (not, of course, to be confused with
any similarly-named personage), who ran the Prussian
Statistical Bureau from 1860 to 1882, was a founder
member of the Verein für  Sozialpolitik—the
Kathedersozialisten. Even more interestingly, Hacking i s
able to illustrate his thesis on the links between economic
and probabilistic doctrines by the career of a turncoat—no
less a individual than Adolph Wagner, the last object of
Marx’s scorn for vulgar political economists.
                                                                                                                                                
26 See Hacking 1990: 114.
 Wagner’s first incarnation was as a laissez-faire free-
trader, in which guise he went out of his way to agree with
Queteletismus (Hacking 1990: 130). But about 1870 he
changed his mind, became a founder professor-socialist
alongside Engel, and began attenuating his fatalism.
In the midst of this debate the best mechanical
materialists did not overlook the problem of giving a
natural account of free will. One attempt was the interest
shown in the work of the French mathematicians Saint-
Venant and Boussinesq on differential equations with so-
called ‘singular solutions’ (equations where, for some
point a, taking values less than but arbitrarily close to a
gives solutions wildly different to those resulting from
choosing points arbitrarily close to but larger than a).
Someone of the stature of James Clerk Maxwell believed
that this was the physical loop-hole that admitted free-will
into a materialist account.27 In Hacking’s words: “Most
of the time what we do is routinely foreordained. But
occasionally we are in the presence of a physical singular
point, when by a choice of one of two acts, arbitrarily close
together, we can achieve totally different effects. Free will
operates, as it were, through the infinitesimal interstices
of singular solutions.”
Maxwell compared the situation to that of a pointsman on
a railway, who does nothing most of the time, but can
direct trains onto different tracks at the crucial moment,
although he noted that “Singular points are by their nature
very isolated, and form no appreciable part of the
continuous source of existence.”
                                                                                                                                                
27 Karl Pearson claimed to hold a letter by Maxwell describing
the French writers’ work as “epoch-making … the great
solution to the problem of free will” (1978: 161, cited by
Hacking (1990: 155)).
VI: Conclusion
Bernstein shows no sign of being aware of any of the 19th
century debate over hyper-determinism; and, if he had
been, his dislike of dialectics would have hobbled his
ability to make anything of it. As it is, he is unable to
clearly distinguish hyper-determinism from historical
materialism—with the result that he himself falls into
precisely the crude economic determinism which he claims
to decry. Indeed, after at first complaining that Marx and
Engels failed to always give enough weight to (supposedly)
non-economic influences, Bernstein’s hostility to
“political expropriation” drives him to scold them for
being insufficiently determinist in their outlook.
12 Bernstein and Engels
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